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31.
为克服样本选择偏误,本文采用倾向得分匹配法,在六年的时间框架内检验了股权激励效应的持续性问题。研究发现:整体而言,激励组的ROE和Tobin’s Q值均显著高于控制组,说明股权激励能有效地提高企业的财务绩效和市场价值;激励组的ROE在股权激励计划实施后的三年时间里均显著高于控制组,三年之后逐渐与控制组无显著差异,表明股权激励对企业财务绩效的提升作用能持续三年时间;激励组的Tobin’s Q值在实施的第一年与控制组无显著差异,但在随后的四年时间里均显著高于控制组,表明股权激励对企业市场价值存在长达四年的持续提升作用,但存在为期一年的时滞效应。 相似文献
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An Examination of the Structure
of Executive Compensation and Corporate Social Responsibility:
A Canadian Investigation 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We explore the extent to which Boards use executive compensation to incite firms to act in accordance with social and environmental objectives (e.g., Johnson, R. and D. Greening: 1999, Academy of Management Journal
42(5), 564–578 ; Kane, E. J.: 2002, Journal of Banking and Finance
26, 1919–1933.). We examine the association between executive compensation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) for 77 Canadian firms using three key components of executives’ compensation structure: salary, bonus, and stock options. Similar to prior research (McGuire, J., S. Dow and K. Argheyd: 2003, Journal of Business Ethics
45(4), 341–359), we measure three different aspects of CSR, which include Total CSR as well as CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses. CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses capture the positive and negative aspects of CSR, respectively. We find significant positive relationships between: (1) Salary and CSR Weaknesses, (2) Bonus and CSR Strengths, (3) Stock Options and Total CSR; and (4) Stock Options and CSR Strengths. Our findings suggest the importance of the structure of executive compensation in encouraging socially responsible actions, particularly for larger Canadian firms. This in turn suggests that executive compensation can be an effective tool in aligning executives’ welfare with that of the “common good”, which results in more socially responsible firms (Bebchuk, L., J. Fried and D. Walker: 2002, The University of Chicago Law Review
69, 751–846; Zalewski, D.: 2003, Journal of Economic Issues
37(2), 503–509). In addition, our findings suggest the importance of institutional context in influencing the association between executive compensation and CSR. Further implications for practice and research are discussed.Lois. Mahoney is an Assistant Professor at Eastern Michigan University. Her research is focused in the areas of ethics and accounting information systems. She has published in ethics and accounting journals including Journal of Business Ethics, Business Ethics Quarterly, Research on Professional Responsibility and Ethics in Accounting, Information and Organization. Dr. Mahoney has received several research awards, including Best Paper award at the Seventh Symposium on Ethics Research in Accounting. Dr. Mahoney is also actively involved in the American Accounting Association.Linda Thorn is an Associate Professor at York University in Toronto Ontario. Her research focuses on ethical decision making, the ethics of accountants and accounting students and ethical aspects of accounting information. She has published in ethics and accounting journal including among others, Business Ethics Quarterly, Journal of Business Ethics, Contemporary Accounting Research, Behavioral Research in Accounting and Audit: A Journal of Practice in Theory. 相似文献
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选取2001—2013年我国沪深A股上市公司数据,对高管任期、R&D支出与企业投资效率三者之间的关系进行实证检验,结果表明:R&D投入随着高管任期的延长而增加;高管任期越长,企业投资效率越高;R&D支出越多,企业投资效率越高;高管任期的延长增强了R&D支出对企业非效率投资的抑制作用;上市公司广泛存在着程度不同的非效率投资现象。 相似文献
35.
管理层股权激励已经在各国的管理实践中得到广泛的运用,企业委托人为了解决与代理人之间的矛盾,对管理层采取了这种长期激励的方式。同时,管理层股权激励的效用可以用企业绩效来测度,因此,管理层股权激励应与企业绩效挂钩。本文分析了上市公司中的股权激励类型及优缺点,并对各种股权激励模式对企业绩效所产生的影响进行了研究。 相似文献
36.
基于行为金融理论,建立了投资者表现为损失厌恶情形下的开放式基金业绩激励模型,并考察了投资者的损失厌恶偏差对开放式基金业绩激励效率的影响。结果表明:在开放式基金的业绩激励机制下,损失厌恶型投资者在面对失败的投资结果时会低估基金经理的投资管理能力,进而低估投资的期望收益;在一定条件下,与完全理性型投资者相比,损失厌恶型投资者会导致业绩激励效率损失增大。 相似文献
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Think Twice Before Going for Incentives: Social Norms and the Principal's Decision on Compensation Contracts 下载免费PDF全文
Principals make decisions on various issues, ranging from contract design to control system implementation. Few studies examine the principal's active role in these decisions. We experimentally investigate this role by studying how a principal's choice of an incentive contract that may discourage misrepresentation, compared to a fixed‐salary contract, affects the honesty of his or her agents’ cost reporting. Results show that, besides an incentive effect and a principal trust effect, the active choice for incentives produces a negative “information leakage” effect. When principals use incentives, their choices not only incentivize truthful reporting and signal distrust, but they also leak important information about the social norm, namely, that other agents are likely to report dishonestly. Agents conform to this social norm by misrepresenting cost information more. Our results have important practical implications. Managers must recognize that their decisions can leak information to their agents, which may produce unanticipated consequences for the social norms of the organization. 相似文献
39.
In this study, we develop and test a theory of CEO relative pay standing. Specifically, we propose that CEOs with negative relative pay standing status (underpaid relative to comparison CEOs) will engage in acquisition activity, as a self‐interested means of attempting to realign their pay with that of their peers. We further propose that, when CEOs with negative relative pay standing acquire, they will tend to finance those acquisitions more heavily with stock than cash, to mitigate the risk associated with those deals. Finally, we argue that acquisition activity will partially mediate the influence of CEO negative relative pay standing on subsequent CEO compensation increases; however, that pay growth will come primarily in the form of long‐term incentive pay. Our results support our predictions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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